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Military Coalitions and Crisis Duration
Daina Chiba, University of Essex
Jesse C. Johnson, University of Kentucky
Forming a military coalition during an international crisis can improve a state’s chances of achieving its political goals.
We argue that the involvement of a coalition, however, can have unintended adverse effects on crisis outcomes by com-
plicating the bargaining process and extending the duration of crises. This argument suggests that crises involving coalitions
should be significantly longer than crises without coalitions. However, other factors that affect crisis duration are also likely
to influence coalition formation. Therefore, taking into account the endogeneity of the presence of a coalition is essential to
testing our hypothesis. To deal with this inferential challenge, we develop a new statistical model that is an extension of
instrumental variable estimation in survival analysis. Our analysis of 255 post–World War II interstate crises demonstrates
that, even after accounting for the endogeneity of coalition formation,military coalitions tend to extend the duration of crises
by approximately 284 days.
M ilitary coalitions are groups of states that collaborateduring an international crisis to issue threats of col-lective military action. Acting through a military co-
alition rather than unilaterally can improve a state’s chances of
achieving its political goals. As a result, states involved in crises
have incentives to form military coalitions. More than 20% of
interstate crises from1946 to 2001 involve amilitary coalition.1
The cost of forming a coalition is often understood as the
compensation that must be provided to partners that may not
have the same interests as the coalition builder (Wolford 2015).
Thus, coalition builders face a trade-off between obtaining
additional military power and making policy concessions to
coalition partners.
We argue, however, that seeking the assistance of a coali-
tion can come at an additional, potentially more deadly, cost.
More specifically, coalitions can prolong international crises
and increase the time participants spend bargaining under the
threat of war. Our argument is based on the notion that the
presence of a coalition can hinder the bargaining process that
precedes any peaceful deal that is reached. A coalition adds
the additional phase of bargaining between partners and com-
plicates bargaining with the adversary.
Extending the duration of crises generates a variety of un-
desirable costs for the participants. The most obvious of these
costs are those associated with being in a constant state of war
preparedness. Crises often involve the mobilization of sub-
stantial amounts of troops and equipment, the procurement
of armaments, regular surveillance of the opposition, and ex-
tensive war planning. In addition to these direct costs, there
is a large body of evidence that suggests crises harm a partici-
pant’s economy (e.g., Hoffmann and Neuenkirch 2017; Rigo-
bon and Sack 2005; Zussman, Zussman, and Nielsen 2008).
These direct and indirect costs continue to add up over the
course of a crisis and come at the expense of other more pro-
ductive ends, making prolonged crises exceptionally costly.
Perhaps most concerning, however, is evidence that increased
duration raises the chances of a crisis turning violent (De-
Rouen and Goldfinch 2005). This suggests that the involve-
ment of a military coalition may not only raise the costs of the
crisis for the participants but also put them at a greater risk
for war.
Thus, estimating the effect of a military coalition on crisis
duration is important to academics and policy makers alike.
However, in estimating this relationship we face a significant
inferential problem. Other factors that affect crisis duration
are also likely to influence coalition formation. Disputantsmay
prefer to form coalitions in crises that are particularly intrac-
table. Thus, coalitions would tend to be present in crises that
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Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu
/dataverse/jop).
1. This figure is based on the data analyzed below.
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are expected to last longer for reasons other than coalition
involvement, positively biasing our estimate of the relation-
ship. However, other states may only be willing to join more
minor crises that are easier to resolve. This would result in
coalitions being present in inherently shorter crises, negatively
biasing our estimate of the relationship. If not addressed, a
positive bias would cause us to overestimate the effect of a
military coalition on crisis duration and a negative bias would
cause us to underestimate the effect.
To address this inferential challenge, we develop a new
statistical model that is an extension of instrumental variable
estimation in survival analysis. The model estimates coalition
formation and crisis duration jointly. This model explicitly
incorporates the correlation between the two processes into
our estimates, controlling for any bias generated by the coa-
lition formation process. The results from our joint model
provide strong support for the theoretical argument. An anal-
ysis of 255 post–World War II interstate crises demonstrates
that, even after controlling for the endogeneity of coalitions,
the involvement of a military coalition tends to extend the
duration of crises by approximately 284 days.
This research proceeds as follows. In the next section, we
discuss the role of military coalitions in crises. We then argue
that the presence of a coalition can lengthen crises, and we
explain how the endogeneity of coalition formation presents
a challenge for evaluating the argument. Following that, we
describe the research design we use to address the potential
endogeneity and test our hypothesis. We then present our em-
pirical results, and in the final section, we discuss the broad
implications of our findings and provide several suggestions
for future research.
MILITARY COALITIONS AND FOREIGN
POLICY CRISES
In pursuit of political goals, states sometimes resort tomilitary
threats. Military threats can help to obtain valuable conces-
sions from other states. Notably, these threats trigger inter-
national crises. A state involved in a crisis experiences a threat
to one or more of its basic values and a heightened probability
of involvement in military hostilities (Brecher andWilkenfeld
1997). Crises do not necessarily result in war and often end
without violence, as the Cuban Missile Crisis did in 1962.
However, some crises, such as the July Crisis of 1914, are not
resolved peacefully and can be accompanied by war.2
A key factor in determining whether a state achieves a
favorable outcome in a crisis is its relative capabilities. If a
crisis escalates to war, the side with greater military capabil-
ities, all else equal, would be expected to have the crisis re-
solved in its favor. This is due to the side with greater capa-
bilities beingmore likely to achieve military victory. However,
even if the crisis never escalates to war, the side with greater
military capabilities will be better able to achieve a more fa-
vorable outcome. This is because any negotiated outcome will
be shaped by expectations of the result that would be pro-
duced by the outside option of war (e.g., Fearon 1995; Powell
1999). Thus, a state benefits from having its threats backed by
more military capabilities.
Recognizing the important role relative military capabili-
ties play in shaping crisis outcomes highlights the incentives
states involved in crises have for forming military coalitions.
A military coalition is a group of states that threaten to use
force together against another state (or states). An obvious ad-
vantage of being part of a coalition is having additional mil-
itary power available. In other words, states aggregate their
capabilities through the formation of military coalitions. Given
the impact of relative power on crisis outcomes, coalition for-
mation, unsurprisingly, can help states obtain more favorable
outcomes in crises. In fact, Morey (2016) demonstrates that
for crises that escalate to war, coalitions are more likely to be
victorious than states fighting outside a coalition.
Although coalition partners provide a state involved in a
crisis clear benefits, their involvement comes at a cost. The
coalition builder must compensate its partners for their co-
operation in crisis bargaining and possible war (Wolford 2015).
Compensation can involve modifying war aims, strategy ad-
justments, dividing the spoils of victory, or costly side pay-
ments. Thus, states deciding whether to enlist the help of co-
alition partners in a crisis face a trade-off between obtaining
additional military power and making policy concessions to
coalition partners. A growing body of research analyzes when
states will make this trade-off and form coalitions in times of
crisis (Kreps 2011; Pilster 2011; Wolford and Ritter 2016) as
well as when other states will agree to join (Tago 2007, 2014).3
Although paying the price to enlist the help of a coalition
partner can improve a state’s chances of victory in a crisis,
research suggests that the presence of coalition partners can
create new political challenges if victory is achieved. More
specifically,Wolford (2017) suggests that victorious coalitions
face unique bargaining problems. Unlike unilateral victors,
a victorious coalition must agree on a division of the new sta-
tus quo and how it will be defended. This creates opportunities
2. See Wolford (2014) for research on how coalitions affect the proba-
bility of crises escalating to war.
3. A related body of research addresses the conditions that lead states
to defect from coalitions (Choi 2012; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago 2015; Wei-
siger 2016).
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for the break down of post-conflict peace that are not present
in the absence of a coalition.
In the next section, we build on the notion that coalitions
introduce a new set of bargaining obstacles to a crisis. How-
ever, we argue that these obstacles are not unique to victori-
ous coalitions negotiating a post-conflict peace. Coalitions can
create bargaining obstacles during crises, lengthening their
duration. The concern during the crisis is not necessarily that
the coalition partners will turn on one another but that a
peaceful settlement will be delayed, extending the costly con-
test and increasing the chances of violence erupting between
the two sides. We begin the next section by explaining how
peaceful settlements are reached in crisis and then how co-
alitions can extend this process through two mechanisms.
MILITARY COALITIONS AND CRISIS DURATION
During a crisis, states bargain under the threat of war. That
is, states disagree over the division of some good, and at least
one side threatens to wage war if its demands are not met. A
crisis ends when amutually agreed on division of the disputed
good is located. Agreements that end crises are often accom-
panied by an event, such as a troop withdrawal or cease-fire,
that marks the reduction in threat perceptions and conflictual
activity to levels that existed before the crisis trigger (Brecher
and Wilkenfeld 1997).
As discussed above, a coalition can help a state achieve a
better outcome than if it acts alone. However, despite this dis-
cernible benefit of forming a coalition during a crisis, we argue
that coalitions can severely complicate crisis bargaining and
lengthen the duration states spend in potentially deadly crisis
situations. More specifically, we argue that coalitions can cause
the lengthening of crises through two interrelated processes.4
First, the presence of a coalition adds an additional stage of
bargaining to the crisis. When crises involve only the primary
disputants, the actors bargain directly with one another over
the disputed good. However, disputants that are members of
a coalition must also bargain with their coalition partner(s).
In the absence of coalition partners, a disputant only needs to
consider its own interests, but acting as part of a coalition
requires a disputant to take into account the preferences of its
partners. If a partner’s demands are not met, it can simply
refuse to participate in the coalition.
The bargaining that occurs among coalition members de-
termines the terms of cooperation and, as a result, the price
a disputant pays for the assistance of a coalition. Intracoali-
tional bargaining typically revolves around developing a joint
strategy for dealing with the adversary. Coalition members
often have divergent preferences over the deals they are willing
to accept from the other side, the level of escalation they are
willing to tolerate, and the resources they are willing to con-
tribute. Coming to agreement on a collective crisis strategy can
take considerable time. For example, at the height of the Cold
War during the 1958 crisis over the Berlin Deadline, it took the
Western powers several rounds of negotiations to form a
response to the Soviet’s demand for the demilitarization of
West Berlin.5 A similar process took place at the start of the
post–Cold War period when the United States negotiated
extensively through a variety of channels to build a large
coalition that eventually coerced Iraq into withdrawing from
Kuwait in 1991.6
Second, beyond adding another bargaining stage, coa-
litions can complicate the bargaining process with the ad-
versary. In crises without coalitions, the disputants spend time
negotiating with one another and figuring out what deals
would be acceptable to the other side. This process is often
obstructed by information asymmetries and incentives the
disputants have tomisrepresent that information (e.g., Fearon
1995). Involving a coalition can magnify this obstacle to crisis
bargaining. When a coalition is involved, the adversary has to
determine the bargaining position of multiple actors and try
to discern how those preferences will be aggregated into a
coalitional position. In negotiations over the demilitarization
of West Berlin, for example, Soviet leadership had to consider
the interests of multiple opponents, the United States, France,
Britain, and West Germany, and then discern how their pref-
erences would be aggregated to form a collective response.
Navigating this more complex bargaining interaction takes
additional time. Sorting through the positions of multiple
opponents and the credibility of each requires more extensive
information gathering and analysis than when faced with a
single opponent. Moreover, the involvement of multiple op-
ponents often generates multiple negotiation fronts. For ex-
ample, after invading and occupying Kuwait, Iraqi Presi-
dent Saddam Hussein not only engaged in talks with Kuwait
but also the United States, the USSR, Israel, Arab League mem-
bers, and others. Creating these additional negotiation fronts
works to extend the time it takes to locate a deal that is
4. While in many formal bargaining models the actors come to agree-
ment without delay, Kennan and Wilson (1993) demonstrate that with un-
certainty bargaining delays are possible. Given the inherent uncertainty in
interstate crises, our argument is more in-line with incomplete information
bargaining models that allow for bargaining delay.
5. See International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project (Brecher and Wilken-
feld 1997) Crisis 168 for more details.
6. See ICB Crisis 393 for more details. Also, see Kreps (2011) for
examples of this phenomenon in a broader set of US-led coalitions in the
post–Cold War period.
1468 / Military Coalitions and Crisis Duration Daina Chiba and Jesse C. Johnson
This content downloaded from 128.163.002.206 on August 01, 2020 20:30:18 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
acceptable to all parties and resolve the crisis. The discussion of
these two interrelated processes leads to our central hypothesis:
Coalition Hypothesis. The involvement of a military
coalition increases the duration of an interstate crisis.
Testing our hypothesis and estimating the effect of coalitions
on crisis duration can provide a clearer picture of the trade-off
states face when deciding whether to obtain coalition partners
or act unilaterally in a crisis. However, estimating this rela-
tionship is not straightforward. There is a potential endoge-
neity issue with the presence of a military coalition. The pro-
cess leading to the presence of a coalition in a crisis can bias
our estimate of the relationship between coalition involve-
ment and crisis duration.
Disputants will most likely pursue coalition partners in
crises when they value the issue under contention highly, or,
in other words, particularly intractable crises. This is because
compensating coalition partners and coordinating with them
is costly, which requires a large benefit, such as acquiring a
highly valued good, to offset. As a result, coalitions will tend
to be involved in crises in which the disputants are willing to
bargain harder and hold out longer for a better deal. If this is
the case, our estimate of the relationship between coalition
involvement and crisis duration will be positively biased,
making it more likely to find support for our hypothesis.
However, it is also possible that potential coalition part-
ners try to avoid the difficult crises and prefer to get involved
in the cases in which a solution is more feasible. In these cases,
coalition builders may still pursue partners because working
through a coalition can defer some of the costs and, oftenmore
importantly, provide legitimacy to their willingness to resort
to war over the issue.7 If coalitions tend to form around these
more manageable crises, it would negatively bias estimates of
the hypothesized relationship, making it less likely to find
support for our hypothesis.
Given the strong potential for bias, a valid test of our hy-
pothesis must take into account all of the factors that influence
both the involvement of a coalition and crisis duration. This
task, however, is complicated by the fact that many of the
factors that need to be controlled for are difficult to measure.
To confront this challenge, we develop and use a new statis-
tical model that is an extension of instrumental variable es-
timation in survival analysis. This model, along with the data
analyzed, is described in detail in the next section.
RESEARCH DESIGN
We analyze the duration of interstate crises spanning from
1946 to 2001 identified by the ICB project (Brecher and Wil-
kenfeld 1997).8 We focus on two-sided crises that involve at
least two crisis actors disputing against one another. To test
our coalition hypothesis, we adopt the crisis as the unit of ob-
servation; we compare crisis duration for crises with and with-
out a military coalition, controlling for potential confounders.9
Crisis duration is defined as the number of days between
the initiation and termination of a crisis. The ICB project
considers the initiation of a crisis to occur when there is an
event “which leads decisionmakers to perceive a threat to basic
values, time pressure for response and a heightened proba-
bility of involvement in military hostilities” (Brecher et al.
2016, 10). The termination date for a crisis is when the actors
perceive relations to return to the precrisis norm. Primary
sources such as speeches, memoirs, and diaries are used by
ICB coders to identify these dates. Crisis duration in our
sample ranges between 2 and 1,462 days. The distribution of
crisis duration is skewed to the right; the mean of crisis du-
ration is about 146 days, whereas the median is 70 days.
We identify military coalitions using the coding of Wol-
ford (2015).10 He defines a military coalition as “a group of
two or more states that makes a threat to use force together
against another state (or states) in an international crisis” (14).
The key part of this definition is that coalitions make threats
of collective military action.11 In other words, coalitions are
not simply actors that are on the same side in a crisis; there
must be some evidence of military cooperation for a group
of states to be considered a coalition. There are 255 crises in
our sample, 54 of which (21%) involve a coalition on at least
one side.
One issue with the 54 crises that involve amilitary coalition
is that for some of them a coalition is only involved for a part
of the lifespan of the crisis. Therefore, we need to be care-
ful to differentiate between cases in which a coalition forms
and extends the duration of a crisis and those cases in which
a coalition joins an ongoing crisis in its late stages. To facili-
tate this, we treat coalition involvement as a time-varying co-
variate and split each crisis into a noncoalition phase and a
7. See both Kreps (2011) and Tago (2007) on the ability of coalitions to
provide legitimacy.
8. We rely on the ICB version 12 data set available at https://sites.duke
.edu/icbdata/ (last accessed on January 3, 2018).
9. Given our theoretical focus on crisis bargaining, we study ICB crises
rather than the more common narrower focus on war duration (e.g., Bennett
and Stam 1996).
10. See table 2.7 in Wolford (2015) for a list of the coded coalitions.
11. It is important to note that coalitions are different from formal
military alliances; coalitions can be formed without an alliance, and not all
allied states form military coalitions in times of crisis.
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coalition phase.12 As a result, coalition involvement is constant
during each crisis phase, and, for those phases with coalitions,
crisis duration is only coded for the period after the coalition
is involved. This allows us to ensure that it is the coalition ex-
tending the crisis and not long crises attracting coalitions.
To identify the parts of a crisis that involve a coalition,
we rely on the ICB participation dates of the coalition mem-
bers. Thus, a coalition is considered present when one side
of the crisis is joined by a state that would qualify as a coali-
tion partner as coded by Wolford (2015).13 Ideally we would
like to know the dates coalition members started bargaining
among themselves. However, these dates are not readily avail-
able and may be unknown for many cases because of in-
centives coalition partners have to conceal their delibera-
tions. As a result, our test is a conservative one because some
of our crisis phases coded as not involving a coalition will
contain periods of intracoalition bargaining that we would
expect to extend crisis duration.
For the 54 crises in which a military coalition is identi-
fied, it is present throughout the entire course of the crisis in
14 (26%) of them. The remaining 40 crises with a coalition
take three general forms. First, in 9 (17%) crises, the coalition
is present at the start of the crisis but drops out before the
crisis terminates. Second, in 19 (35%) of the crises, the coa-
lition joins an ongoing crisis and stays until its end. Finally,
in 12 (22%) crises, the coalition joins an ongoing crisis and
drops out before the crisis ends. This generates a sample of
307 crisis phase observations for 255 crises.
Figure 1 shows the observed distribution of crisis dura-
tion for all the crises (top panel), those without a coalition
(middle panel), and those that involve a coalition at one point
in their lifespan (bottom panel). Consistent with our coali-
tion hypothesis, crisis duration has a higher mean for crises
with a coalition (241 days) than for crises without a coali-
tion (120 days).14While this comparison provides preliminary
support for our hypothesis, the remaining discussion explains
how we attempt to isolate the impact of a coalition on cri-
sis duration.
To make a valid comparison of crisis phases with and
without a military coalition, we need to control for potentially
confounding factors that may influence both the presence
of a coalition and crisis duration in evaluating our coalition
hypothesis. We thus control for two observable variables that
might be correlated with both crisis duration and coalition
formation. The first factor we control for is involvement by
an intergovernmental organization (IGO) in the crisis. A co-
alition may be more likely to be formed when the disputants
are able to acquire an explicit backing from the international
community through an IGO; at the same time, an IGO may
be more likely to be involved in crises that are expected to
escalate and last longer (Chiba and Fang 2014). To avoid a
positive omitted variable bias, we create a dummy variable
coded 1 if an IGO is involved in a crisis and 0 otherwise.
The data are based on the information from the ICB data set
(Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).
The other factor we control for is the degree of military
disparity between the two sides.We expect crises to be shorter
when one side has a clear military advantage over the other
side. Importantly, military disparity will be positively related
to our coalition variable when coalitions provide states with
a military advantage and negatively related when coalitions
balance the capabilities of the two sides. Therefore, it has the
potential to be an important control variable.15 The measure
is equal to the stronger side’s military capability divided by
the sum of all disputants military capabilities.16 Military ca-
pability is operationalized using the Composite Index of Na-
tional Capabilities score from the Correlates of War (COW)
project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). This variable ranges
between 0.5 (power parity) to 1 (power disparity).
In addition to these covariates, we include fixed effects
that control for unit-level heterogeneities. We use the list of
“protracted conflicts” from the ICB project to identify the
unit for fixed-effect estimation.17 This list identifies a set of
12. As is typically done in a standard duration analysis with time-varying
covariates, we treat all nonterminal phases as right censored.
13. This means that there are some small discrepancies between Wol-
ford’s and our codings ofmilitary coalitions;Wolford’s data set contains seven
additional military coalitions in which none of the coalition members are
included as a crisis actor in the ICB data set.
14. It is apparent from the histograms that there are two potential
outliers, the Second Yugoslavian Crisis of 1992 and the Democratic Republic
of Congo Crisis of 1998, with duration longer than 1,000 days. Additionally,
both of these crises involved a coalition. Therefore, in a robustness check
presented below, we drop these observations from our analysis. Our conclu-
sions do not change when these two cases are excluded from the analysis.
15. Military disparity is a function of coalition, which suggests that this
variablemaywell be treated as a posttreatment variable rather than a potential
confounding variable. For this reason, we also estimate models for which it is
excluded, and our conclusions do not change.
16. We also created an alternative operationalization of this variable that
excludes the military capabilities of coalition partners. As we discuss below,
we use this alternative measure in our joint model to predict coalition for-
mation. As a robustness check, we also use the alternative measure instead of
the one that includes the capabilities of coalition partners in the duration
equation. Our conclusions do not change in this alternative specification.
17. In a robustness check, we employ an alternative strategy for dealing
with crisis-level heterogeneity and control for the type of issue underlying the
crisis. This is done via a set of dummy variables based on the ICB’s coding of
the principal issue area for the crisis actors. Our conclusions do not change
when this alternative specification is used.
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countries, regions, or country pairs that experience interna-
tional crises repeatedly. In our data, 61% of crises occur within
the context of one of 29 different protracted conflicts.18 Fixed-
effect models allow us to make comparisons within each pro-
tracted conflict, controlling for factors specific to each of the
protracted conflicts. In other words, we only compare Arab-
Israeli crises to other Arab-Israeli crises rather than, for ex-
ample, to Indo-Pakistani crises.
However, even after including the covariates and fixed
effects described above, there may be unmeasured factors
that limit our ability to draw valid inferences. As discussed in
the previous section, difficult-to-measure factors, such as the
tractability of a crisis, may influence both crisis duration and
the presence of a coalition. If these factors are not controlled
for, our estimates of the hypothesized relationship will be
biased. Therefore, we construct a new statistical model that
estimates coalition formation and crisis duration jointly, con-
trolling for the correlation between unobservable factors that
affect the two processes.19
Figure 1. Histograms of observed crisis duration with and without a coalition
18. The list of protracted conflicts included in our data with the number
of crises that occur in that conflict in parentheses is as follows: Angola (10),
Chad-Libya (8), Ethiopia-Somalia (5), Rhodesia (11), Western Sahara (4),
Zaire-Rwanda (2), Costa Rica–Nicaragua (2), Ecuador-Peru (3), Honduras-
Nicaragua (5), Afghanistan-Pakistan (3), China-Vietnam (4), India-Pakistan
(11), Indochina (5), Indonesia (4), Korea (2), North Korea Nuclear (1),
Finland-Russia (1), Italy-Albania-Yugoslavia (1), Poland-Russia (2), Yugo-
slavia (3), Georgia-Russia (1), Arab-Israel (23), Iran-Iraq (3), Iraq-Kuwait (5),
Yemen (3), East-West (20), Greece-Turkey (8), Taiwan Strait (4), and Iraq
Regime (4). 19. The appendix contains the derivation of the model.
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The statistical model is an extension of instrumental var-
iable regression models and shares some similarities with
other multiequation duration models.20 The model incorpo-
rates an equation for coalition formation and another for
crisis duration and allows the error terms for the two equa-
tions to be correlated. Moreover, the correlation coefficient
allows us to test whether the unobservable factors that extend
crisis duration make coalition formation more or less likely.
If the unobservable factors make coalition formation more
likely, the correlation coefficient will be positive and signifi-
cant, and if they make it less likely, the correlation coefficient
will be negative and significant. Estimating themodel requires
an assumption about the joint distribution of the correlation
between the errors and an identification strategy. The distri-
butional assumptions are discussed in the appendix, and our
identification strategy is explained below.
To facilitate identification of the joint model, the equation
for coalition formation should contain at least one indepen-
dent variable that does not appear in the duration equation.
Such identifier variables are expected to influence coalition
formation, influence crisis duration indirectly through coali-
tions, but not influence crisis duration directly. The strategy
we employ to identify our model stems from a large literature
that emphasizes the importance of geography for conflict ex-
pansion.21 More specifically, we exploit the finding that states
in close proximity to a conflict, especially contiguous ones, are
more likely to intervene (e.g., Joyce, Ghosn, and Bayer 2014;
Siverson and Starr 1990, 1991). It is argued that this is because
geographic proximity increases the feasibility of military in-
volvement for a state. States further away and separated by
borders havemore constraints on their ability to intervene in a
dispute. In other words, in terms of Most and Starr’s (1989)
classic work, contiguous states are more likely to have the
“opportunity” to participate in a military coalition. However,
importantly for our analysis, once a state decides to get in-
volved, the duration of the crisis will not be influenced by the
geographic characteristics of the joiner. Both contiguous and
noncontiguous coalitions engage in intracoalitional bargain-
ing and complicate bargaining with the adversary.
To create our identifying variable we count the number of
states contiguous to side one and the number contiguous to
side two. We then use the maximum of these two counts. The
idea being that whether the crisis experiences a coalition will
be more heavily influenced by the side that has more neigh-
bors. To code contiguity we use the COW Direct Contiguity
data set (Stinnett et al. 2002). We estimate a model in which
the coding of this variable is based solely on states that share
a border and a model in which contiguity also includes those
states separated by 400 miles of water or less.
For the duration equation of our statistical model, we
adopt a parametric duration specification. We use model fit
statistics to choose between three different parametric speci-
fications of the underlying hazard. Specifically, we estimate
Weibull, log normal, and log logistic models and choose the
one that bests fits the data in terms of the Akaike informa-
tion criterion.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Before presenting results from our new model, we first re-
port results from single-equation duration models that do not
jointly estimate coalition formation and crisis duration. These
models allow us to gauge the importance of controlling for the
endogeneity of coalition formation. The estimation results are
presented in table 1. All four of the models include protracted
conflict-level fixed effects, although the estimated coefficients
for the 30 fixed-effect terms are not shown for purposes
of brevity. The coefficients for the independent variables are
20. See, e.g., Boehmke, Morey, and Shannon (2006) and Chiba, Mar-
tin, and Stevenson (2015). Whereas the duration models introduced in these
two articles are designed to address selection bias, our model is designed to
correct endogeneity. However, both sets of models are similar in that they
employ a separate equation to explain either the initial selection or the en-
dogenous regressor. For a discussion of a general statistical framework to
construct multiequation models to facilitate causal inferences, see Braumoel-
ler et al. (2018).
21. Our identification strategy closely follows one employed by Morey
(2016) in an analysis of the impact of coalitions on interstate war outcomes.
Table 1. Duration Models of International Crises, 1946–2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coalition 1.161*** 1.096*** 1.183*** 1.110***
(.249) (.252) (.249) (.251)
IGO involvement .267 .327*
(.174) (.177)
Military disparity 2.729 2.949
(.569) (.578)
Log(j) .191*** .187*** .188*** .182***
(.044) (.044) (.044) (.044)
Crisis phases 307 307 307 307
Crises 255 255 255 255
AIC 884.7 884.3 885.1 883.7
Note. All four models are based on the log normal specification. Positive co-
efficients are associated with longer duration. Estimates on fixed-effect param-
eters are omitted for brevity. Standard errors in parentheses. AIC p Akaike
information criterion; IGO p intergovernmental organization.
* p ! .10
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
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shown in the accelerated failure time metric; positive esti-
mates are associated with longer duration, and negative esti-
mates are associated with shorter duration. As mentioned
above, we estimate three different parametric durationmodels
for each of the four combinations of independent variables
to choose the best-fitting parametrization for the underlying
risk of crisis termination. As it turns out, the log normal spec-
ification performs the best in all four models. The estimated j
is approximately 1.2 across all four models, suggesting that
the hazard rate rises to its peak quickly and then falls.22
We find consistent support for the coalition hypothesis
from all four models; the estimated coefficient for the coali-
tion variable is positive and statistically significant, whether
we control for IGO involvement, military disparity, or both.
To illustrate the substantive effect of a coalition on crisis du-
ration, we calculate predicted mean duration for crises with
and without a coalition based on the best-fitting model in
table 1, model 4, holding constant the IGO involvement and
military disparity variables at their median values (1 and 0.84,
respectively). The fixed-effect parameters are set at the values
for crises that occur outside any protracted conflict.
Figure 2 plots the predicted crisis duration for the two
scenarios.23 The predicted mean duration for crises without
a coalition is about 128 days; the predicted crisis duration
rises to 384 days when a crisis involves a coalition. The es-
timated impact of having a coalition on crisis duration is
therefore 256 days with the 95% confidence interval of (114,
458). This represents a 200% increase in the estimated crisis
duration. Thus, our single-equation models indicate that the
presence of a coalition is having a large substantive impact on
the duration of crises.
Although the models in table 1 provide support for the
coalition hypothesis, they do not completely rule out our con-
cerns of endogeneity. Therefore, table 2 reports estimation
results from our joint models of coalition formation and crisis
duration. The first part of the table reports estimated coef-
ficients for variables included in the crisis duration equation,
and the second part reports those included in the coalition
formation equation. The third part of the table reports the
estimated correlation coefficient for each model, which de-
notes the correlation between the errors in the two equations.
As before, the protracted conflict fixed-effect coefficients are
not reported for purposes of brevity. Model 5 is our main
model, and models 6–8 provide important robustness checks.
The first piece of information to note from table 2 is that
the estimated correlation parameter is negative and statisti-
cally significant across all four models.24 This indicates that
our joint model is necessary to test our hypothesis and that
unobserved factors were biasing the estimates from the single-
equation models. Moreover, it suggests that unobservables
that contribute to shorter crises alsomake coalition formation
more likely. In other words, coalitions form during inherently
shorter crises, negatively biasing our previous estimates.
Figure 3 plots the predicted crisis duration for the two
scenarios based on our joint model. The predicted mean du-
ration for crises without a coalition is about 12 days; the pre-
dicted crisis duration rises to 296 days when a crisis involves a
coalition. The estimated impact of having a military coalition
on crisis duration is therefore 284 days with the 95% confi-
dence interval of (163, 488), approximately one month longer
than the estimate obtained from the single-equation model.
Moreover, the revised estimates indicate that the involvement
of a coalition causes a 2,367% increase in the estimated crisis
duration, which is substantially larger than the percentage in-
crease obtained from the single-equation model. Thus, failing
to control for the endogeneity issue with our joint model un-
derestimates the effect of a coalition on crisis duration. Our
revised estimates suggest that a crisis without a coalition would
last less than two weeks, but if that crisis were to involve a
coalition it would be extended by more than 9 months. This
finding indicates that soliciting the help of coalition partners
can come at a significant cost for a state.
22. Since jmust be constrained to be positive, we estimate log(j) instead.
We can obtain the value of j by exponentiating the estimated logged j.
23. For all figures, uncertainty estimates are obtained by following the
procedure proposed by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).
Figure 2. Impact of coalition on crisis duration from single-equation model.
Predictedmean crisis duration for crises with andwithout a coalition based on
the best-fitting model in table 1, model 4. The two independent variables are
held constant at their median value, and fixed-effect parameters are set at
values for crises that occur outside a protracted conflict. Mean duration is
calculated by numerically integrating the estimated survivor function.
24. Since the correlation coefficient, r, must be between 21 and 1, we
estimate the inverse hyperbolic tangent of r.
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In addition to our main model, table 2 presents several
notable modifications to our joint model. First, we examine
the robustness of our result to a reasonable alternative coding
of our identifying variable. More specifically, model 6 dem-
onstrates that the result holds even when we restrict neigh-
bors to those states sharing a border. Second, as mentioned in
footnote 14, we drop the two crises in which the duration is
longer than 1,000 days, the 1992 Second Yugoslavian Crisis
and the 1998 Democratic Republic of Congo Crisis, both of
which involve a coalition. Model 7 indicates that these cases
are not driving our results. Finally, we drop two cases that
have an exceptional number of coalition members. Both the
1990 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo crisis involved 11 coa-
lition members, and the next largest coalition in the data has
5 coalition members. Model 8 demonstrates that the result
does not depend on the inclusion of these two cases.
Unlike the single-equation models in table 1, the joint
models presented in table 2 provide information about the
determinants of coalition formation. Importantly, the esti-
mates show that the number of surrounding neighbors sig-
nificantly increases the probability of coalition formation. This
is consistent with our expectations and provides a key piece
of evidence in support of our identification strategy. With re-
gard to the other variables, IGO involvement increases the
probability of a coalition forming but has no effect on crisis
duration. Thus, it is possible that the only effect IGO involve-
ment has on crisis duration is through the encouragement
of coalition formation. Military disparity seems to have no
effect on coalition formation, but it consistently shortens cri-
sis duration.
The purpose of our joint model is to control for unmea-
sured factors related to both crisis duration and coalition
Table 2. Joint Models of Coalition Formation and Crisis Duration, 1946–2001
Main Land Border Duration Outliers Coalition Outliers
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Crisis duration:
Coalition 3.364*** 3.186*** 3.370*** 3.650***
(.514) (.606) (.514) (.335)
IGO involvement .108 .139 .103 .093
(.202) (.199) (.202) (.202)
Military disparity 21.200** 21.142* 21.190** 21.074*
(.603) (.611) (.604) (.596)
Log(j) .312*** .293*** .313*** .334***
(.069) (.075) (.069) (.056)
Coalition formation:
IGO involvement .787*** .778*** .796*** .762***
(.274) (.278) (.274) (.262)
Military disparity (without coalition) .547 .630 .533 .567
(.680) (.704) (.679) (.650)
Neighbors (land 1 sea) .074*** .075*** .075***
(.022) (.022) (.021)
Neighbors (land) .115***
(.037)
Constant 23.049*** 23.127*** 23.040*** 23.100***
(.682) (.707) (.681) (.665)
Correlation (r) 2.842*** 2.793*** 2.843*** 2.913***
(.114) (.156) (.114) (.049)
Crisis phases 307 307 305 305
Crises 255 255 253 253
AIC 3,150.9 3,151.0 3,150.2 3,110.4
Note. All four models are based on the log normal specification. Positive coefficients in the crisis duration equation are associated with longer duration.
Estimates on fixed-effect parameters included in the duration equation are omitted for brevity. Standard errors in parentheses. AIC p Akaike infor-
mation criterion; IGO p intergovernmental organization.
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
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formation. However, our joint model ignores the process by
which states select into crises. Given that previous research
suggests initiators select crises strategically on the basis of
whether a target will receive support, we want to ensure that
the sample selection process is not biasing our estimates
(Gartner and Siverson 1996; Werner 2000). Therefore, as a
robustness check, we test our hypothesis employing a sample
selection model, model 9 in table 3. This model is similar to
the one developed by Boehmke et al. (2006), but our model
allows for more flexibility in the correlation coefficient.25
We estimate the model using a sample of all dyad years.26
The dependent variable for the selection equation codes
whether the dyad experiences an ICB crisis in a given year.
Variables that capture the likelihood of two states having a
dispute, such as distance, contiguity, and similarity of interests
between the potential disputants based on UN voting, are
included in the selection equation and used to identify the
model.27 The results from this model also provide support for
the hypothesis. Moreover, the correlation parameter for this
model is insignificant, indicating that the crisis selection pro-
cess can be safely ignored for our analysis.
The final set of analyses we conduct disaggregate the co-
alitions in our sample to consider whether certain types of
military coalitions experience longer crises than others. One
natural extension of our argument is that larger coalitions
may extend crisis duration more than smaller coalitions. This
is because increasing the number of coalition members may
exacerbate the bargaining problems described above. To test
this possibility, model 10 in table 3 replaces our coalition
Figure 3. Impact of coalition on crisis duration from joint model. Predicted
mean crisis duration for crises with and without a coalition based on our main
model, model 5. The other independent variables are held constant at their
median value, and fixed-effect parameters are set at values for crises that
occur outside a protracted conflict.
Table 3. Supplementary Models of International Crises,
1946–2001
(9) (10) (11)
Crisis duration:
Coalition .986***
(.259)
Coalition size (logged) 1.092***
(.233)
Only one major
power in coalition
.946***
(.359)
Other coalition 1.244***
(.326)
IGO involvement .363** .343* .325*
(.179) (.176) (.177)
Military disparity 2.784 21.048* 2.961*
(.615) (.579) (.578)
Log(j) .190*** .181*** .181***
(.046) (.044) (.044)
Crisis involvement:
Military disparity .180
(.112)
Distance 2.092***
(.008)
Contiguity 1.059***
(.065)
Interest similarity 2.614***
(.069)
Peace years 2.110***
(.008)
Peace years2 .004***
(.0005)
Peace years3 2.00005***
(.000007)
Constant 21.955***
(.131)
Correlation (r) 2.151
(.112)
Dyad years 555,944
Crisis phases 299 307 307
Crises 249 255 255
AIC 8,727.8 880.8 885.2
Note. All three models are based on the log normal specification. Positive
coefficients in the crisis duration equation are associated with longer dura-
tion. Estimates on fixed-effect parameters included in the duration equation
are omitted for brevity. Standard errors in parentheses. AIC p Akaike in-
formation criterion; IGO p intergovernmental organization.
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
25. The derivation of the statistical model is included in the replica-
tion materials.
26. Dyad-year observations are created based on the COWproject’s state
systemmembership list (version 2016), available at http://correlatesofwar.org
(last accessed on January 3, 2018). We drop six ICB crises that involve a non-
COW member state.
27. Variables for the selection model were obtained using the NewGene
software (Bennett, Poast, and Stam 2017).
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dummy variable with a logged count of the number of coa-
lition members. The results suggest that increasing the size
of a coalition extends the duration of the crisis. Thus, when
states strengthen their coalition through the inclusion of new
members, they are also extending the duration of the crisis.
More specifically, increasing the size of a coalition from two to
three members, extends the duration of a crisis by approxi-
mately 80 days with the 95% confidence interval of (28, 156).
One possible strategy for minimizing the obstacles a coa-
lition creates is by forming the coalition around a single major
power. Given that the major power will have the most capa-
bilities and be essential to the success of the coalition, the other
members may defer to the major power’s bargaining stance,
simplifying the bargaining. To test this possibility, model 11
in table 3 includes two coalition variables, one coding those
that involve a single major power and one capturing all other
coalitions. The results indicate that both types of coalitions
extend the duration of crises, and the effect is slightly smaller
for single major power coalitions, but the difference is not
significant. Therefore, it seems that even single major power
coalitions generate considerable bargaining obstacles that ex-
tend crises. One possible explanation for this lack of differ-
ence between the two types of coalitions is that minor powers
that get included in coalitions are important enough to their
coalition’s success that their preferences get considered in in-
tracoalition bargaining and by the other side.
Future research should continue to consider whether cer-
tain types of coalitions experience shorter crises than other
coalitions. It is possible that forming a coalition among states
with similar preferences or that have an existing alliance agree-
ment may alleviate some of the bargaining obstacles a coali-
tion introduces to a crisis. Analyses along these lines will pro-
vide policy makers choosing among a set of possible coalition
partners a more nuanced understanding of the implications
of any given choice.
CONCLUSION
Our research highlights an often overlooked cost of military
coalition participation. Introducing a coalition to a crisis can
lengthen the crisis and extend the time disputants spend
bargaining under the threat of war. This finding provides a
clearer picture to policymakers of the trade-offs associatedwith
achieving foreign policy goals through a coalition. However,
in addition to providing useful insights for policy makers, our
findings have broad implications for several areas of study.
First, our findings contribute to a growing body of research
on bargaining delays. Whereas our focus is on bargaining de-
lays in interstate crises, previous studies examine bargaining
delays, for example, in civil wars (Cunningham 2006) and
cabinet formation in parliamentary democracies (Golder 2010;
Martin and Vanberg 2003). Similar to our findings, these
studies demonstrate that increases in the number of relevant
actors extend the duration of bargaining. Thus, when taken
together, these seemingly disparate areas of research converge
on a more general finding. Future research should seek to
identify the broader conditions under which the involvement
of an additional actor contributes to bargaining delay.
Second, our research highlights the importance of intra-
coalition bargaining. An extensive body of research in inter-
national relations examines various aspects of the bargaining
that occurs between adversaries, but our understanding of
bargaining among actors on the same side of a dispute is less
developed. Developing an understanding of intracoalition
bargaining is key to understanding when coalitions will form
and the price states pay to obtain partners. Recent research
on alliances has made some progress in this area, but this
work has the benefit of relying on alliance treaties to extract
information about the bargained outcomes among partners
(Johnson 2015). Thus, a systematic analysis of bargained out-
comes reached among coalition partners would entail orig-
inal data collection but would be a worthwhile effort that
would significantly advance research on the politics of mili-
tary coalitions.
Finally, the impact of the coalition formation process on
our empirical analysis suggests the need for greater attention
to endogenous regressors in international relations research.
A significant body of work in international relations high-
lights the importance of accounting for sample selection and
strategies for doing so (e.g., Boehmke et al. 2006; Reed 2000;
Sartori 2003), but the topic of endogenous regressors has
received considerably less attention. Our joint model offers
one possible strategy for dealing with this inferential challenge
and will, hopefully, prove useful for others addressing this
issue in their research.
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APPENDIX
We derive a statistical model that estimates the probability of
coalition formation and crisis duration jointly and thereby
addresses the endogeneity of coalition formation. For each
international crisis phase i p 1, ... , n, we define a latent
random variable c＊i to represent the disputants’ propensity to
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form a coalition. We allow c＊i to be a function of covariates zi
and their coefficients g, such that
c＊i p zig1 εi; ðA1Þ
where εi is an error term with a symmetric distribution char-
acterized by a cumulative distribution function Fε(⋅). We do
not observe the value of c＊i directly; instead we observe ci p 1
(a coalition is formed) when c＊i 1 0 and ci p 0 (a coalition is
not formed) when c＊i ≤ 0. In addition, we define another
random variable t＊i that represents the latent duration for
crisis phase i, such that
log(t＊i ) p bci 1 xid1 a
21hi; ðA2Þ
where b captures the effect of ci on the duration of crisis
phase, xi is a vector of covariates, d is a vector of coefficients,
and hi is an error term with a cumulative distribution func-
tion Fh(⋅) and density function fh(⋅), scaled by a.
However, univariate estimation of equation (A2) may not
give us an unbiased estimate of b if some unobservable fac-
tors influence c＊i and t
＊
i simultaneously, resulting in a cor-
relation between εi and hi. For example, suppose a coalition
is more likely to be formed in more “intractable” crises that
tend to last longer. This implies that εi and hi will be posi-
tively correlated. Then, when εi takes an unusually high
value, hi will on average take an unusually high value. Unless
we account for the correlation between the two terms, we will
overestimate b, because part of the effect of hi on t＊i will be
picked up by b. In other words, we will incorrectly attribute
to b the effect of any part of hi that is correlated with εi.
To obtain an unbiased estimate of b, we thus need a sta-
tistical model that estimates equations (A1) and (A2) jointly
while controlling for the correlation between εi and hi. The
likelihood function for such a statistical model takes the fol-
lowing form:
Lp ∏
n
ip1
Pr(t＊i p ti∩c
＊
i 1 0)
ci(12di)Pr(t＊i p ti∩c
＊
i ≤ 0)(12ci)(12di)
Pr(t＊i 1 ti∩c
＊
i 1 0)
cidiPr(t＊i 1 ti∩c
＊
i ≤ 0)(12ci)di ;
ðA3Þ
where ti is the observed duration of a crisis phase and di is the
censoring indicator coded 1 for censored crisis phases and 0
otherwise. To specify this likelihood function, we need to
characterize a joint distribution of t＊i and c
＊
i . Since t is du-
ration and c is binary, specifying the joint distribution of the
two is not straightforward. We use a copula function to bind
together the two univariate probability distributions Fε(⋅) and
Fh(⋅) to produce a bivariate probability distribution.28 Spe-
cifically, for two random variables x＊1 and x
＊
2 with associated
univariate distribution functions F1(⋅) and F2(⋅), the bivariate
distribution can be characterized as F12(x1; x2) p Pr(x＊1 !
x1∩x＊2 ! x2) p C(F1(x1); F2(x2); v), where C(⋅, ⋅; v) is a bi-
variate copula function, and v is a parameter that measures
the degree of association between x＊1 and x
＊
2 .
The first component of (A3), the joint probability that a
coalition is formed and the crisis phase lasted for duration
ti, is obtained by applying Bayes’s rule and taking the deriv-
atives of the joint distributions, as follows:
Pr(t＊i p ti∩c
＊
i 1 0) p Pr(c
＊
i 1 0jt＊i p ti)# Pr(t＊i p ti)
ðA4Þ
p Pr(εi ≤ zigjt＊i p ti)# f h(ti) ðA5Þ
p
∂C(Fε(zig); Fh(ti); v)
∂Fh(ti)
# f
h
(ti) ðA6Þ
p Cεjh(Fε(zig); Fh(ti); v)# f h(ti); ðA7Þ
where Cajb(x; y; v) is called a conditional copula that gives
Pr(a ! xjb p y). The second component of (A3), the joint
probability that a coalition is not formed and the crisis lasted
for duration ti, is obtained simply by
Pr(t＊i p ti∩c
＊
i ≤ 0) p Pr(t＊i p ti)2 Pr(t＊i p ti∩c＊i 1 0)
ðA8Þ
p f
h
(ti)2 Cεjh(Fε(zig); Fh(ti); v)# f h(ti): ðA9Þ
The third component of (A3), the joint probability that
a coalition is formed and the crisis phase is censored at
duration ti, is
Pr(t＊i 1 ti∩c
＊
i 1 0) p Pr(t
＊
i 1 ti∩ εi ≤ zig) ðA10Þ
p Pr(εi ≤ zig)2 Pr(t＊i ≤ ti∩εi ≤ zig) ðA11Þ
p Fε(zig)2 C(Fh(ti); Fε(zig);2v) ðA12Þ
p C(12 Fh(ti); Fε(zig); v): ðA13Þ
Finally, the last component of (A3), the joint probability
that a coalition is not formed and the crisis phase is cen-
sored at duration ti, is
Pr(t＊i 1 ti∩c
＊
i ≤ 0) p Pr(t＊i 1 ti)2 Pr(t＊i 1 ti∩c＊i 1 0)
ðA14Þ
p 12 Fh(ti)2 C(12 Fh(ti); Fε(zig); v): ðA15Þ
From among several different copula functions that can
be assigned to C(⋅, ⋅; v), we choose the Gaussian copula be-
cause of its flexibility. It captures the association between
28. For applications of copula functions in political science, see Chiba,
Martin, et al. (2015), Chiba, Metternich, and Ward (2015), and Fukumoto
(2015).
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the two random variables via a correlation coefficient r, which
ranges between 21 (perfect negative correlation) and 1 (per-
fect positive correlation). A positive estimate of r would in-
dicate that a coalition is more likely to be formed in crises
that tend to last longer, and a negative estimate would indi-
cate that a coalition is less likely to be formed in crises that
tend to last longer. More importantly, the model enables us
to test our hypothesis on the effect of coalitions on crisis
duration, controlling for the endogeneity of coalition forma-
tion. We assign Weibull, log normal, and log logistic distri-
butions to Fh(⋅), and choose the one that fits the data better.
We assign a standard normal distribution to Fε(⋅) throughout
the estimation.
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Corrigendum
In footnote 20 of their article “Military Coalitions and Crisis
Duration” (Journal of Politics 81, no. 4 [2019]: 1466–79), Daina
Chiba and Jesse C. Johnson compare their estimator to two
other existing multi-equation duration models developed by
Boehmke,Morey, and Shannon (2006) andChiba,Martin, and
Stevenson (2015) and point out that their estimator differs
from existing models. They should have, however, acknowl-
edged that Boehmke’s (2006) estimator is the closest to theirs.
The authors were unfortunately unaware of Boehmke’s (2006)
estimator when they developed theirs. His application is a
seemingly unrelated regression and theirs is an instrumental-
variable regression, but the underlying estimators are essen-
tially the same. The primary difference is that Chiba and John-
son’s model is derived as a special case within a flexible copula
framework that allows them to specify and estimate models
with different distributional assumptions. For example, in ad-
dition to the probit–log normal model that was developed in
Boehmke (2006), Chiba and Johnson derived and estimated
probit-Weibull and probit–log logistic specifications to choose
the best-fitting model. This is consistent with one of the sug-
gested directions for future research proposed by Boehmke
(2006, 437).
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